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Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in Legal Interpretation 
Lawrence M. Solan* & Tammy Gales** 
In this paper, we set out to explore conditions in which the use of 
large linguistic corpora can be optimally employed by judges and others 
tasked with construing authoritative legal documents. Linguistic 
corpora, sometimes containing billions of words, are a source of 
information about the distribution of language usage. Thus, corpora 
and the tools for using them are most likely to assist in addressing legal 
issues when the law considers the distribution of language usage to be 
legally relevant. As Thomas R. Lee and Stephen C. Mouritsen have so 
ably demonstrated in earlier work, corpus analysis is especially helpful 
when the legal standard for construction is the ordinary meaning of the 
document’s terms. We argue here that four issues should be addressed 
before determining that corpus analysis is likely to be maximally 
convincing. First, the legal issue before the court must be about the 
distribution of linguistic facts. Second, the court must decide what 
makes an interpretation “ordinary.” Third, if one wishes to search a 
corpus to glean the ordinary meaning of a term, one must decide in 
advance what to search. Fourth, there are different reasons as to why a 
particular meaning might present a weak showing in a corpus search, 
and these need to be understood. Each of these issues is described 
and  discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this Article, we explore conditions in which the use of large 
linguistic corpora can be optimally employed by judges and others 
tasked with construing authoritative legal documents. Linguistic 
corpora, sometimes containing billions of words, are a source of 
information about the distribution of language usage both between 
populations and within a single population. Thus, corpora and the 
tools for using them are most likely to assist in addressing legal issues 
when the law considers the distribution of language usage to be 
legally relevant. As Thomas R. Lee and Stephen C. Mouritsen have 
so ably demonstrated in earlier work, corpus analysis is especially 
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helpful when the legal standard for construction is the ordinary 
meaning of a law’s terms.1 
We argue here that four issues should be addressed before 
turning to corpus linguistics as the most efficacious tool in statutory 
interpretation. First, the legal issue before the court must be about 
the distribution of linguistic facts. Surely, separating the “ordinary” 
sense of an expression from outlying ones meets this criterion. As we 
show below, however, courts do not universally adopt the ordinary 
meaning of a term. Instead, they often engage in detailed inquiry 
into the context of the legislation to determine what meaning was 
most likely intended. 
Second, along these same lines, the court must decide, as a legal 
matter, what makes an interpretation “ordinary.”2 In one Supreme 
Court case, Justice Breyer held that a particular meaning of the word 
“carry” was ordinary because one-third of usages in a corpus of news 
articles conveyed the same meaning.3 In a sense it is ordinary, in that 
people appear to be comfortable using the word to convey that 
particular meaning. In another sense, it is not ordinary to the extent 
that a second meaning predominates over the remaining two-thirds 
of recorded instances of usage.4 
Third, if one wishes to search a corpus to glean the ordinary 
meaning of a term, one must decide, in advance, what to search. In a 
case decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan, all seven justices 
agreed that a corpus search was a superior way to determine ordinary 
meaning but divided four to three on what terms to evaluate.5 This is 
especially apt to happen when a law contains a term that typically has 
one meaning when unmodified but is subject to modification that 
suggests the default meaning was not the intended one. The 
 
 1. See Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, YALE L.J. 
(forthcoming); Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus 
Linguistics as an Empirical Path to Plain Meaning, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 156 
(2011); Stephen C. Mouritsen, Note, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies 
and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915 [hereinafter 
Mouritsen, Dictionary]. 
 2.  See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 1, for further discussion. 
 3.  Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 129, 140 (1998). 
 4.  We discuss this case in detail below. See Mouritsen, Dictionary, supra note 1, for a 
more refined corpus analysis of this case. 
 5.  People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832 (Mich. 2016). 
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Michigan case, for example, involved deciding whether the word 
information includes false statements or is ordinarily limited to true 
statements. While we can speak of inaccurate information, when we 
use the word without modification, we typically understand it as 
referring to actual facts.  
Fourth, there are two very different reasons for a particular 
meaning to present a weak showing in a corpus search. In some 
instances, it is possible, but awkward, to use a particular expression 
to describe an event or a set of circumstances. For example, in 
Chisom v. Roemer, a case that dealt with the scope of the Voting 
Rights Act, the Court had to determine whether the law’s reference 
to the election of representatives should be read in its ordinary sense, 
rendering the statute inapplicable to the election of judges.6 All nine 
Justices agreed that representative is usually applied to members of 
the legislative branch and not the judicial branch, but the majority 
construed the statute more broadly than the law’s ordinary meaning 
based on the assumption that Congress did not intend to create a 
safe harbor for racially discriminatory schemes for the election 
of  judges.7 
In other cases, a particular usage may be absent from a corpus 
not because speakers are uncomfortable using the expression in that 
way, but because it reflects relevant circumstances that do not often 
arise. Consider Smith v. United States, the 1993 Supreme Court 
decision in which a majority of six Justices held that a person who 
attempted to trade his unloaded machine gun for illegal drugs had 
“‘use[d]’ . . . a firearm . . . ‘during and in relation to . . . [a] drug 
trafficking crime.’”8 The case hinged on whether he had “used the 
gun” in the ordinary sense of that expression. Justice Scalia’s colorful 
dissent argued that when we think about someone using a gun we 
think about that person using it as a weapon.9 He was right about 
that; however, apart from linguistic arguments, the majority argued 
that the structure of the statute suggested that a broader 
 
 6.  Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991). 
 7.  Id. at 403–04. 
 8.  Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 225 (1993) (second alteration in original) 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988)). 
 9.  Id. at 242–44 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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interpretation of use was warranted.10 In contrast with understanding 
representative to include judges, moreover, it does not seem strange 
to say that Smith really did use a gun in a drug crime. He just used it 
in an unusual way. 
Thus, there are two reasons that a meaning may be absent from a 
corpus. The first is a fact about language: people may not feel that 
the meaning fits comfortably within the concept that the word 
denotes and typically do not use it in those circumstances, although 
it may be possible to do so at the margins. The second reason that a 
particular meaning may be absent from a corpus concerns facts about 
the world, rather than facts about or knowledge of language. The 
blue pitta is a bird found in Asia but not North America.11 It is no 
less a bird, and we are no less comfortable calling it a bird just 
because it does not appear in corpora of American English. This 
example further illustrates the necessity of selecting an appropriate 
corpus to analyze ordinary meaning. 
Should the legal system concern itself with the distinct reasons 
for a term not appearing in a corpus?  That depends on whether the 
legal system should examine ordinary meaning to inquire further 
into a statute’s purpose or whether the legal system relies on 
ordinary meaning to capture the situations that likely triggered the 
legislation. In the former case, it matters why a particular use of a 
word does not appear in a corpus in a particular circumstance. 
Below, we argue that these two perspectives can be merged through 
a process of double dissociation.12 That is, the strongest cases for 
using corpus analysis are ones in which not only does one meaning 
predominate over an alternative meaning in an appropriate corpus, 
but the second, less common meaning is generally expressed using 
language other than the language in the disputed statute. Put in 
linguistic terms, the question is whether the legal system should use 
corpora as a reflection of the distribution of language use as an 
external matter, or whether it should regard corpora as windows into 
the internal workings of the mind, to the extent that corpora reflect 
 
 10.  Id. at 240. 
 11. J. Erritzoe, Blue Pitta (Hydrornis cyaneus), HANDBOOK OF THE BIRDS OF THE 
WORLD ALIVE (J. del Hoyo et al. eds., 2017), http://www.hbw.com/species/blue-pitta-
hydrornis-cyaneus. 
 12.  See infra Section III.B.4. 
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when people are actually comfortable using an expression in a 
particular circumstance. 13 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, we 
discuss ordinary meaning as a foundational principle of legal 
interpretation and the extent to which it is defeasible. Part II briefly 
outlines the ways that judges seek to determine a term’s ordinary 
meaning—most often through their sense about word meaning but 
augmented by the use of dictionaries. Part III first presents an 
introduction to corpus linguistics, then discusses a recent trend to 
introduce linguistic corpora into the analysis, and, finally, evaluates 
the various cases according to our four proposed criteria listed above. 
Part IV is a brief conclusion. 
I. ORDINARY MEANING AS AN INTERPRETIVE NORM 
A. The Centrality of the Ordinary Meaning Principle 
Scholars and judges from across the political spectrum routinely 
apply the ordinary meaning canon.14 To illustrate, consider Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion in the 2014 Supreme Court case Burrage v. 
United States.15 Burrage, a drug dealer, sold heroin to a user who 
died the next day from a drug overdose. The Controlled Substances 
Act calls for an enhanced sentence for a defendant who has sold 
illegal drugs when “death or serious bodily injury results from the 
use of such substance.”16 At trial, medical experts testified that it was 
impossible to determine whether the heroin Burrage sold the user 
was a but-for cause of death or a contributing factor of a death that 
 
 13.  Linguists and philosophers occupy both camps. For the leading internalist 
perspective, see NOAM CHOMSKY, KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE: ITS NATURE, ORIGIN, AND 
USE (1986). For a good exposition of the externalist perspective, see ERNIE LEPORE & 
MATTHEW STONE, IMAGINATION AND CONVENTION: DISTINGUISHING GRAMMAR AND 
INFERENCE IN LANGUAGE (2015). For critique of Lepore and Stone, see Laurence Horn, 
Conventional Wisdom Reconsidered, 59 INQUIRY 145 (2016). 
 14.  See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO 
READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 33–84 (2016); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. 
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 69–77 (2012); BRIAN G. 
SLOCUM, ORDINARY MEANING: A THEORY OF THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF 
LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2015); LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS 
AND THEIR INTERPRETATION 50–81 (2010). 
 15. Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014). 
 16.  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2012). 
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might have occurred anyway because of the various drugs ingested 
during the binge, including, but not limited to, the heroin Burrage 
had sold. This raised the interpretive issue of whether the death 
“resulted from the use” of the substance that Burrage provided.17 
Justice Scalia resolved the issue by relying on the ordinary meaning 
of “resulting from,” which denotes causation: 
The language Congress enacted requires death to “result from” use 
of the unlawfully distributed drug, not from a combination of 
factors to which drug use merely contributed. Congress could have 
written § 841(b)(1)(C) to impose a mandatory minimum when the 
underlying crime “contributes to” death or serious bodily injury, or 
adopted a modified causation test tailored to cases involving 
concurrent causes, as five States have done . . . . It chose instead to 
use language that imports but-for causality. Especially in the 
interpretation of a criminal statute subject to the rule of lenity, . . . 
we cannot give the text a meaning that is different from its 
ordinary, accepted meaning, and that disfavors the defendant.18 
Justice Scalia provided two justifications for applying the 
ordinary meaning of the term. The first is that Congress 
presumptively intended this meaning. For, if Congress intended a 
different, broader interpretation, it could have said so in clear 
language—as other legislatures have done in enacting statutes 
covering the same situations. Thus, the ordinary meaning approach 
enhances democratic values because it presumptively captures the 
will of the legislature. His second argument, for which he adduced 
the rule of lenity, is quite different. Regardless of what the legislature 
intended, adhering to the ordinary meaning of statutory language 
enhances the rule of law because it takes into account the likelihood 
that citizens subject to the law—the criminal law in particular—are 
on adequate notice of behavioral norms that society will enforce. 
The argument is reminiscent of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s 1931 
opinion for a unanimous Court in McBoyle v. United States19 that a 
1919 federal law criminalizing the movement of stolen vehicles 
across state lines should not be applied to airplanes since, at the time 
 
 17.  Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 885. 
 18.  Id. at 891. 
 19.  McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931). 
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of enactment, airplanes would not have been within the ordinary 
understanding of the word vehicle. At the conclusion of a very short 
opinion, Holmes remarked: 
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the 
text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a 
fair warning should be given to the world in language that the 
common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a 
certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible 
the line should be clear. When a rule of conduct is laid down in 
words that evoke in the common mind only the picture of vehicles 
moving on land, the statute should not be extended to aircraft 
simply because it may seem to us that a similar policy applies, or 
upon the speculation that if the legislature had thought of it, very 
likely broader words would have been used.20 
“Fair warning” to the accused is not about deference to the 
legislature. Rather, it is itself a very basic rule-of-law value, regardless 
of what the legislature had in mind. Chief Justice John Marshall 
articulated this principle in 1821 in United States v. Wiltberger.21 
Wiltberger committed manslaughter by killing an individual while 
aboard an American vessel docked in the Tigris River in China.22 A 
federal statute made it a federal offense to commit certain crimes on 
American vessels abroad.23 The provision that covered murder 
included murder committed “upon the high seas, or in any river, 
haven, basin, or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State,” 
but the provision that covered manslaughter included only “the 
high  seas.”24 
The most sensible inference to draw is that Congress simply 
made a mistake in omitting the other bodies of water from the 
manslaughter provision. Marshall recognized this but rejected it as a 
proper way to conduct statutory interpretation: 
It has been argued, and, we admit, with great force, that in this 
section the legislature intended to take from a citizen offending 
 
 20.  Id. at 27. 
 21.  United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 76 (1820). 
  22.  Id. at 77. 
  23.  Id. at 77–86. 
  24.  Id. at 79–80. 
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against the United States, under colour of a commission from a 
foreign power, any pretence to protection from that commission; 
and it is almost impossible to believe that there could have been a 
deliberate intention to distinguish between the same offence, 
committed under colour of such commission, on the high seas, and 
on the waters of a foreign State, or of the United States, out of the 
jurisdiction of any particular State. This would unquestionably have 
been the operation of the section, had the words, ‘on the high 
seas,’ been omitted. Yet it would be carrying construction very far 
to strike out those words. Their whole effect is to limit the 
operation which the sentence would have without them; and it is 
making very free with legislative language, to declare them totally 
useless, when they are sensible, and are calculated to have a decided 
influence on the meaning of the clause.25 
Thus, Marshall favored an ordinary meaning approach because it 
gave fair warning to the defendant even though the legislature most 
likely intended a broader meaning. 
 Scholars have also espoused both rationales—carrying out the 
intent of the legislature and giving public notice of the law—for 
preferring a law’s ordinary meaning. William Eskridge, often a vocal 
critic of Scalia’s thinking,26 makes very similar points when it comes 
to the centrality of ordinary meaning in statutory interpretation. 
Like Scalia, he sees value in the approach, both as a default 
interpretation most likely to reflect the will of the legislature and as a 
value in its own right, enhancing the law’s legitimacy because of its 
greater accessibility.27 Brian Slocum, in his book on ordinary 
meaning, also emphasizes the overlapping values of employing 
the  concept.28 
This consensus leaves open, however, a set of questions about 
which there is far less agreement. Among them are:  
• What do we mean by ordinary meaning? When we speak of 
what a word ordinarily is used to mean, we can refer to the 
one most typical meaning or to a range of meanings that are 
 
 25.  Id. at 99–100. 
 26.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 531 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 14). 
 27.  ESKRIDGE, supra note 14, at 35. 
 28.  See SLOCUM, supra note 14. 
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all reasonably common, regardless of which one is the 
most  common.  
• How much of a role should context play in our analysis? A 
word may typically be used to convey one thought in a 
particular context but typically be used to convey a different 
thought in another context.  
• If one of those contexts occurs more frequently than the 
other, should we call the meaning associated with that 
context the ordinary meaning, or should we consider them 
both ordinary? For example, if we speak more about savings 
banks than we do about river banks, should we conclude that 
only the sense of the word that describes financial institutions 
is ordinary? Or should we say that both meanings are within 
ordinary usage? 
• When a word whose meaning changes when modified is used 
without a modifier in a legal setting, should we assume that 
the legislature had the unmodified default interpretation in 
mind, or should we assume that it had in mind how that 
word might be understood with whatever modifications are 
likely to be relevant? Some words have one meaning when 
not accompanied by a modifier, such as an adjective, but can 
be modified to expand our range of plausible interpretations. 
An example from the case law discussed below is the 
word  information.29 We can speak of false or inaccurate 
information, but when we just use the word alone, we 
typically mean to describe an accurate account of facts. 
B. The Defeasibility of the Ordinary Meaning Principle 
As central as ordinary meaning is in the interpretation of laws, it 
is defeasible. Sometimes courts determine that the legislature 
intended an interpretation that is either broader or narrower than 
the prototypical use of a word or phrase. Narrower interpretations 
often occur when the context in which the law was enacted suggests 
that the legislature had in mind only a subset of the plausible 
situations in which the language of the statute might apply. By the 
 
 29.  See infra Section III.B.3 (discussing conducting the search in the right corpora). 
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same token, courts sometimes construe a statute as having a broader 
interpretation than ordinary meaning would dictate. 
To illustrate from some recent cases decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court under Chief Justice Roberts, consider Yates v. United 
States.30 Following corporate scandals that occurred in the first years 
of this century, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which 
placed disclosure obligations on corporate executives, accountants, 
and lawyers and prohibited the destruction of documents and other 
materials to thwart government investigations even if those materials 
had not yet been subpoenaed.31 This provision was a reaction to the 
behavior of Arthur Andersen LLP, the accounting firm of Enron 
Corporation, which had been manipulating prices in the energy 
sector.32 The accounting firm destroyed documents and 
electronically-stored information on the eve of a government 
investigation into its role in the Enron scandal.33 As a result, the firm 
was convicted of obstructing justice.34 That conviction, however, was 
reversed because the firm had not yet been subpoenaed and claimed 
that it was under no legal obligation to maintain the records.35 Soon 
thereafter, in 2002, Congress made it clear that the destruction of 
documents in anticipation of a federal investigation would be a 
criminal act going forward. The relevant portion of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act provides: 
 Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers 
up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or 
tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence 
the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the 
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States . . . 
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, 
or both.36 
 
 30.  Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015). 
 31.  Id. at 1074. 
 32.  For an overview of the facts surrounding Arthur Andersen’s involvement in the 
Enron scandal, see Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). 
 33.  Id. at 696, 700. 
 34.  Id. at 696–98. 
 35.  Id. at 708. 
 36.  18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012). 
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Fast forward a decade. John Yates was a commercial fisherman 
catching grouper in the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Florida.37 
Some of the fish caught and crated on his fishing boat were smaller 
than the legal minimum size.38 When law enforcement agents pulled 
up alongside Yates’s vessel, Yates had the undersized fish thrown 
overboard and replaced them with larger fish in the same crates.39 
Yates was prosecuted and convicted by the trial court of violating the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act for having destroyed a tangible object [dead 
fish] for the purpose of impeding a government investigation.40 
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction in a five-to-four 
decision, holding that the act should not be applied to this situation 
because, read in context, the relevant provision should be limited to 
the destruction of financial records, whether stored on paper or on a 
tangible object (such as a computer drive).41 Justice Ginsburg noted 
in her majority opinion: 
 Whether a statutory term is unambiguous, however, does not 
turn solely on dictionary definitions of its component words. 
Rather, “[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is 
determined [not only] by reference to the language itself, [but as 
well by] the specific context in which that language is used, and the 
broader context of the statute as a whole.”42 
Indeed, the noscitur a sociis canon says that statutory words 
should be construed in association with the words that surround 
them.43 By the same token, the title of the statutory provision, 
“Destruction, Alteration, or Falsification of Records in Federal 
Investigations and Bankruptcy,” suggests that the law was intended 
to deal with documents and the like, not fish. Courts are reluctant to 
use a law’s title to override the law’s substantive provisions, but they 
 
 37.  Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1079 (2015). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 1080. 
 40.  Id. at 1080–81. 
 41.  Id. at 1088–89. 
 42.  Id. at 1081–82 (citations omitted). 
 43.  See ESKRIDGE, supra note 14, at 76–78; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 14, 
at  195–98. 
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are willing to take a statute’s title into account to add sufficient 
context to help determine the scope of the words within the law.44 
Justice Kagan (usually an ally of Justice Ginsburg on the Court) 
wrote a dissenting opinion that began with the ordinary meaning 
approach to statutory interpretation: “When Congress has not 
supplied a definition, we generally give a statutory term its ordinary 
meaning.”45 Thus, the Court was divided over the extent to which it 
is appropriate to engage in individual inquiry into legislative intent in 
the teeth of the default rule of ordinary meaning. 
Consider, similarly, Bond v. United States,46 a 2014 unanimous 
Supreme Court decision (with three Justices concurring in the 
judgment on constitutional instead of statutory grounds). Dr. Bond 
discovered that the father of her close friend’s soon-to-be-born child 
was Bond’s own husband.47 A microbiologist, she took from her 
workplace a powder that could cause a skin rash upon contact and 
spread it on her friend’s door knob, mailbox, and other such surfaces 
to induce irritation.48 Eventually it worked.49 Bond was caught and 
prosecuted for violating the statute that implements the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, 
and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction,50 a treaty that 
the United States ratified in 1997. The statute defines chemical 
weapon as follows: “A toxic chemical and its precursors, except where 
intended for a purpose not prohibited under this chapter as long as 
the type and quantity is consistent with such a purpose.”51 The 
chemicals used by Bond, if ingested in sufficient quantity, could be 
fatal.52 The statute defines toxic chemical as follows: 
The term “toxic chemical” means any chemical which through its 
chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary 
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. The term 
includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their 
 
 44.  See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 14, at 221. 
 45.  Yates, 134 S. Ct. at 1091 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 46.  Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
 47.  Id. at 2085. 
48.    Id. 
49.    Id. 
 50.  Id. at 2085. 
 51.  18 U.S.C. § 229F(1)(A) (2012). 
 52.  Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085. 
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method of production, and regardless of whether they are 
produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.53 
Thus, the substance used by Bond met the statutory definition of 
toxic chemical. 
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and its affirmance 
by the Third Circuit.54 It held that the Chemical Weapons 
Convention was intended to respond to war crimes, not to the facts 
of this case, which seemed to be a simple assault and more 
appropriate for local prosecution.55 Chief Justice Roberts wrote for 
the majority: 
But even with its broadly worded definitions, we have doubts that a 
treaty about chemical weapons has anything to do with Bond’s 
conduct. The Convention, a product of years of worldwide study, 
analysis, and multinational negotiation, arose in response to war 
crimes and acts of terrorism. There is no reason to think the 
sovereign nations that ratified the Convention were interested in 
anything like Bond’s common law assault.56 
Roberts had a point—one would not ordinarily regard what Dr. 
Bond did as a crime that violated a ban on the use of chemical 
weapons. But, as Roberts comes close to conceding, if one pays 
attention to the statutory definition of toxic chemical, rather than to 
the everyday use of chemical warfare, the linguistic argument is hard 
to maintain.57 More convincing is the structural argument, similar to 
the majority’s argument in Yates, that the law implementing the 
treaty was not likely intended to extend its reach to minor crimes 
outside the ordinary jurisdiction of the federal government and 
within the constitutional power of the states.58 Thus, ordinary 
meaning bowed to the statute’s structure, its purpose, and principles 
of federalism. 
 
 53.  18 U.S.C. § 229F(8)(A). 
 54.  Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2077. 
 55.  Id. at 2087. 
 56.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 57.  Id. at 2094. 
 58.  Id. at 2093–95. 
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In separate concurring opinions, Justices Scalia,59 Thomas,60 and 
Alito61 would have declared the law implementing the treaty 
unconstitutional as a usurpation of state power. Justice Scalia made it 
clear that as far as he was concerned, Bond had violated the law, 
based on its language.62 Thus, he rejected the majority’s reliance on 
the ordinary meaning of the words in the title and, implicitly, its 
structural argument.63 Scalia wrote: 
The statute parses itself. There is no opinion of ours, and none 
written by any court or put forward by any commentator since 
Aristotle, which says, or even suggests, that ‘dissonance’ between 
ordinary meaning and the unambiguous words of a definition is to 
be resolved in favor of ordinary meaning.64  
As for the constitutional argument, which all three dissenters 
embraced as a reason for striking down the statute as outside 
congressional authority, Justice Alito summarized the argu-
ment  succinctly: 
The control of true chemical weapons, as that term is customarily 
understood, is a matter of great international concern, and 
therefore the heart of the Convention clearly represents a valid 
exercise of the treaty power. But insofar as the Convention may be 
read to obligate the United States to enact domestic legislation 
criminalizing conduct of the sort at issue in this case, which 
typically is the sort of conduct regulated by the States, the 
Convention exceeds the scope of the treaty power.65 
The debate among the justices in Bond illustrates a long-standing 
tension in statutory analysis between construing statutes in a manner 
that would avoid constitutional issues and addressing constitutional 
issues directly. What is unusual about Bond is that both sides of the 
debate came to the same conclusion about the outcome of the case.  
 
 59.  Id. at 2094 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 60.  Id. at 2102 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 61.  Id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 62.  Id. at 2094 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 63.  See id. at 2096–97. 
 64.  Id. at 2096. 
 65.  Id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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A more typical illustration is United States v. X-Citement 
Video,  Inc.,66 a case interpreting the federal law criminalizing the 
transmission of child pornography. The statute was poorly drafted, so 
that one interpretation seemed to impose strict criminal liability for 
those who knew they were sending some kind of depiction (video 
tapes in this instance) but did not know that the depictions 
contained child pornography.67 The statute read in relevant part: 
(a) Any person who— 
(1) knowingly transports or ships using any means or facility of 
interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or 
foreign commerce by any means including by computer or mails, 
any visual depiction, if— 
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a 
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and 
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; 
. . . . 
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.68 
The owner of a business called X-Citement Video was peddling 
videos containing child pornography.69 He claimed that the statute 
was unconstitutional because it required the government to prove 
that he knew that he was distributing pornographic videos but not 
that he knew the players were underage.70 The wording of the 
statute, however, does not appear to require that the defendant 
know that he was shipping depictions containing child 
pornography.71 Knowingly seems to modify only “transports or ships 
in interstate . . . commerce . . . any visual depiction.”72 He certainly 
knew he was doing that. 
The justices agreed that absent a mens rea requirement for the 
element that the depiction contain pornography, the law would be 
 
 66.  United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994). 
 67.  Id. at 68–70. 
 68.  18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2012). 
 69.  X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 66. 
 70.  Id. at 67. 
 71.  Id. at 68. 
 72.  Id. 
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unconstitutional.73 A majority of seven, in an opinion written by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejected “the most grammatical reading” of 
the language as written, judicially amending the statute to include a 
state of mind requirement for the element that the depiction contain 
child pornography.74 Justice Stevens concurred by saying that the 
statute, as written, should be construed as containing such a 
requirement.75 Justice Scalia dissented, saying the statute was 
unconstitutional,76 presaging his concurrence in Bond some twenty 
years later.77 
Courts do, at times, give statutory terms meanings that are 
broader than their ordinary usage would suggest. For example, 
Chisolm v. Roemer,78 discussed above,79 held that state supreme court 
justices come within the category of representatives under the Voting 
Rights Act.80 
More recently in 2015, in King v. Burwell,81 the Court construed 
language in the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) more broadly 
than ordinary usage would permit.82 The statute requires those with 
incomes deemed sufficient to pay the premiums83 to purchase health 
insurance or pay a fine.84 It further calls for federal government 
subsidies through the tax system for those who do not meet the 
income threshold and who purchase their insurance on “an 
Exchange established by the State.”85 Not all of the states established 
exchanges on which its residents could buy health insurance. The 
statute called for the federal government to establish exchanges in 
those states that decided not to participate on their own.86 The 
 
 73.  Id. at 78. 
 74.  See id. at 70 (discussing whether the justices should amend the statute judicially to 
include the state of mind requirement that would allow it to meet constitu-
tional  requirements). 
 75.  See id. at 79 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 76.  Id. at 86 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 77.  Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2094–2111 (2014). 
 78.  Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991). 
 79.  See supra Intro. 
 80.  Chisom, 501 U.S. at 399. 
 81.  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 82.  Id. at 2492. 
 83.  26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(a), (e)(1)(A) (2012). 
 84.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A. 
 85.  26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A). 
 86.  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487. 
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plaintiffs in King were residents of Virginia, a state that did not 
establish an exchange.87 Rather, the federal government established 
the exchange on its behalf.88 The plaintiffs claimed that, because the 
Virginia insurance exchange was not “established by the state,” the 
residents were not entitled to the subsidies through the Internal 
Revenue Service and, therefore, should be considered outside the 
mandate requiring them to buy the insurance.89 
Writing for a majority of six Justices, Chief Justice Roberts held 
the statute to be “ambiguous.”90 The majority acknowledged that 
the ordinary interpretation of the phrase established by the State 
would suggest that the state itself had to establish the exchange for 
the provision to apply. However, the Court held that, in the context 
of the entire statute, the intended meaning of the expression 
included exchanges established by the federal government on behalf 
of the state if the state did not set up its own exchange: 
Petitioners’ arguments about the plain meaning of Section 36B are 
strong. But while the meaning of the phrase “an Exchange 
established by the State . . . ” may seem plain “when viewed in 
isolation,” such a reading turns out to be “untenable in light of 
[the statute] as a whole.” In this instance, the context and structure 
of the Act compel us to depart from what would otherwise be the 
most natural reading of the pertinent statutory phrase.91 
We do not agree with the Chief Justice that the law was 
“ambiguous.”92 Rather, it was inconsistent or contained an 
incoherence. More convincing is the Court’s structural argument—
without the subsidies, the entire system of the act would collapse in a 
majority of the states, and it is unlikely that Congress intended that 
to happen.93 
For jurisprudential reasons, the Court was reluctant to say that 
Congress had erred in its wording (choosing instead to declare the 
 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 2488. 
 90.  Id. at 2492. 
 91.  Id. at 2495. (quoting Dep’t of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 
343 (1994)). 
 92.  Id. at 2491. 
 93. See id. at 2496. 
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statute ambiguous),94 but in all likelihood the inconsistent language 
among the statute’s provisions was an oversight in a complicated law 
whose language was being negotiated up until the time of 
enactment. As Abbe Gluck explains in her perceptive article about 
this case, the language arose from the Senate bill’s having drawn on 
language from the drafts of two different committees, and because of 
the procedure used to enact the law, there was no opportunity to 
clean it up through a conference committee that would reconcile the 
House and Senate versions.95 The Chief Justice recognized this 
reality and resolved the law’s inconsistencies to further its “overall 
statutory scheme”96 as identified in the structure of the statute itself. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has, in other contexts, had little 
trouble inferring that state means state or federal. Mims v. Arrow 
Financial Services, LLC,97 involved the interpretation of the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), which 
prohibits telemarketers from engaging in robocalls and other such 
practices. If a pattern of such conduct emerges within a state, the 
state Attorney General may bring an action. With respect to TCPA 
actions brought by State Attorneys General, the statute provides: 
“The district courts of the United States . . . have exclusive 
jurisdiction.”98 The statute also grants a private right of action. With 
respect to the jurisdiction of those cases, the statute says:  
A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws 
or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of 
that State—  
(A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the 
regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin 
such  violation,  
 
 94.  For a discussion of the Court’s reluctance to declare a statute to be erroneously 
drafted and then to correct it, see Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 
811, 813 (2016) (arguing that the Court generally requires uncontestable evidence of an error 
before applying the doctrine). 
 95.  See Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s 
Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 63, 76–77 (2015). 
 96.  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492. For a theory of legislation as plans, see SCOTT J. 
SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011). 
 97.  Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 368–70 (2012). Our thanks to 
Jonah Gelbach for bringing this case to our attention. This case was not part of the discussion 
in King. 
 98.  47 U.S.C. § 227(g)(2) (2012). 
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(B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such 
a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such 
violation, whichever is greater, or  
(C) both such actions.99 
Mims believed that Arrow Financial Services’ calls had violated 
the statute and brought a case in federal court. Arrow successfully 
moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
based on the provision just quoted. The dismissal was upheld on 
appeal. However, in a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court 
reversed. The Court ruled that the specific mention of state 
jurisdiction does not strip the court of the federal question 
jurisdiction it would ordinarily have as a matter of law. Comparing 
the exclusivity provision for Attorneys General to the grant of 
jurisdiction to state courts in private rights of action, the Court 
reasoned: “Section 227(g)(2)’s exclusivity prescription ‘reinforce[s] 
the conclusion that [47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)’s] silence . . . leaves the 
jurisdictional grant of § 1331 untouched. For where otherwise 
applicable jurisdiction was meant to be excluded, it was 
excluded  expressly.’”100 
 By the same token, if Congress had intended to permit the ACA 
to fail by its very structure, disallowing subsidies for those who live 
in states in which the federal government initiated exchanges on 
behalf of the state, it most likely would have indicated this intent 
directly in one way or another.101 
Justice Scalia would have none of this: 
Any effort to understand rather than to rewrite a law must accept 
and apply the presumption that lawmakers use words in “their 
natural and ordinary signification.” Ordinary connotation does not 
always prevail, but the more unnatural the proposed interpretation 
of a law, the more compelling the contextual evidence must be to 
show that it is correct. Today’s interpretation is not merely 
unnatural; it is unheard of. Who would ever have dreamt that 
 
 99.  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 
 100.  Mims, 565 U.S. at 380–81 (alterations in original) (quoting Verizon Md., Inc. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U. S. 635, 644 (2002)). 
 101.   See Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Sherlock Holmes Canon, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1  (2016). 
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“Exchange established by the State” means “Exchange established 
by the State or the Federal Government”?102 
Thus, whether interpreting a statute more narrowly or more 
broadly than ordinary meaning would permit, it is within the court’s 
discretion to treat ordinary meaning as defeasible and to use 
contextual information—including a statute’s purpose and 
structure—as interpretive tools. The debate among jurists and 
scholars is how defeasible ordinary meaning should be in these 
circumstances. This issue sets a boundary condition on the efficacy 
of corpus analysis in statutory interpretation since corpora are of 
little use when a court determines that fidelity to a statute’s purpose 
should take priority over the ordinary meaning of its terms.  
II. FINDING ORDINARY MEANING 
Once a court determines that the ordinary meaning of a statute’s 
language should carry the day, it must determine which of the 
alternative interpretations proposed by the parties is the “ordinary” 
one. The task itself assumes that words have a single, ordinary 
meaning and that, presumably, other meanings are outliers, perhaps 
extraordinary meanings. Sometimes this presumption seems 
reasonable. Returning to Chisom v. Roemer,103 for example, the term 
representative really is typically used to refer to legislators, and judges 
are typically not referred to as representatives. In other instances, 
however, it is not at all clear that one meaning is ordinary while 
others are not.104 To make this determination requires the legal 
system to reach an understanding of what makes ordinary meaning 
ordinary. As Lee and Mouritsen105 observe, the system has not yet 
done so. 
Judges typically use three methods in determining the ordinary 
meaning of a term: their own knowledge of the language, 
dictionaries as a purportedly neutral source of information about 
meaning, and empirical research using a corpus of English. As an 
 
 102.  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(citation  omitted). 
 103.  Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991). 
 104.  See discussion of Smith v. United States, supra text accompanying notes 8–10. 
 105.  See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 1. 
2.GALESSOLAN_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2018  3:54 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
1332 
initial matter, even when a court decides that a statutory word 
should be given a meaning that is broader or narrower than ordinary 
usage, the court is likely to engage in ordinary meaning analysis as 
part of the decision to look elsewhere. Thus, whatever method of 
interpretation a court adopts, finding the ordinary meaning of a 
term is likely to be part of the analysis in which the court engages. 
A. Native Speaker Intuition 
All of us use knowledge of our native language as our principal 
interpretive tool. A colorful example came from the 1973 Watergate 
hearings in which Senator Sam Ervin, Chair of the Senate Select 
Committee, questioned President Nixon’s Chief Domestic Advisor, 
Mr. Ehrlichman.106 The questioning concerned the government’s 
having broken into the office of the psychiatrist treating Daniel 
Ellsberg, the individual responsible for the public release of the 
Pentagon Papers.107 
Senator Sam Ervin: The foreign intelligence activities had nothing 
to do with the opinion of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist about his 
intellectual or emotional or psychological state. 
John Ehrlichman: How do you know that, Mr. Chairman? 
Senator Sam Ervin: Because I can understand the English 
language. It’s my mother tongue.108 
This process is good enough to get us through our lives every 
day. In the realm of statutory interpretation, however, the task is not 
limited to understanding the gist of what someone is saying but 
 
 106.  For discussion of Ehrlichman’s positions in the Nixon Administration, see John D. 
Ehrlichman, RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, https://www.nixonlibrary. 
gov/forresearchers/find/textual/special/smof/ehrlichman.php (last visited Jan. 27, 2018). 
 107.  The Pentagon Papers is the informal name given to a report of the U.S. 
Department of Defense entitled United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study 
Prepared by the Department of Defense. It received notoriety because it contained facts and 
explanations at odds with the public statements of President Johnson about U.S. involvement 
in the Vietnam War. The Pentagon Papers are available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/interactive/us/2011_PENTAGON_PAPERS.html. 
 108.  Video: U.S. Senator Sam Ervin, Jr., Questions John Ehrlichman, an Aide to President 
Richard Nixon, During the Televised Senate Watergate Hearings in 1973, BRITANNICA KIDS, 
http://kids.britannica.com/comptons/art-173893/US-Senator-Sam-Ervin-Jr (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2018). 
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requires making subtle line-drawing decisions about when one 
category should end and another begin. Thus, the interpretation of 
statutory language often involves judgments about far smaller 
distinctions than everyday life demands. 
Moreover, while people within a speech community109 seem to 
share intuitions about whether a sentence is grammatical or not,110 
there seems to be far less consensus about facts concerning the 
relative distribution of word usage. People are subject to what 
psychologists have termed false consensus bias. We tend to assume 
ourselves to be normal. 
Solan, Rosenblatt, and Osherson studied false consensus bias as 
applied to the interpretation of equivocal contract terms.111 In one 
scenario, participants in an experiment were asked whether they 
believed that damage to property should be attributed to “earth 
movement” when the damage was caused by the percussive force of 
a neighbor’s blasting activity as part of a construction project.112 
Their responses varied: 40% said yes, 40% said no, and 20% said they 
could not tell.113 These same people were then told that 100 people 
just like them had been asked these questions, and were asked to 
estimate how many of those hundred agreed with their judgments. 
The percentages were grossly overestimated: 67%, 63%, and 36%, 
respectively.114 Judges who participated in the study also exhibited 
 
 109.  A speech community is a group of people who both speak the same language and 
share norms for its usage. See Richard Norquist, Speech Community in Sociolinguis-
tics,  THOUGHTCO., https://www.thoughtco.com/speech-community-sociolinguistics-1692 
120 (last updated Apr. 26, 2017). There is disagreement about how to define the term. For a 
discussion of this topic, see generally Peter L. Patrick, The Speech Community, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE VARIATION AND CHANGE 573 (J.K. Chambers et al. eds., 2002). 
 110.  For recent research comparing the intuitions of linguists in professional journals 
with survey data, see generally Kyle Mahowald et al., SNAP Judgments: A Small N 
Acceptability Paradigm (SNAP) for Linguistic Acceptability Judgments, 92 LANGUAGE 619 
(2016); Jon Sprouse, Carson T. Schütze & Diogo Almeida, A Comparison of Informal and 
Formal Acceptability Judgments Using a Random Sample from Linguistic Inquiry 2001-2010, 
134 LINGUA 219 (2013); Jon Sprouse & Diogo Almeida, Assessing the Reliability of Textbook 
Data in Syntax: Adger’s Core Syntax, 48 J. LINGUISTICS 609 (2012). 
 111.  Lawrence Solan, Terri Rosenblatt & Daniel Osherson, False Consensus Bias in 
Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268 (2008). 
 112.  Id. at 1287–90. 
 113.  Id. at 1290. 
 114.  Id. 
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false consensus bias.115 People tend to believe that their own 
intuitions comport with those of others. Moreover, when false 
consensus bias is added to the inevitable problem of confirmation 
bias in substantive decision making,116 intuitive estimates of facts 
about how word usage is distributed do not appear likely to be 
very  reliable. 
B. Dictionaries 
We will not belabor the fact that judicial reliance on dictionaries 
has been the subject of sharp criticism by legal academics117 and, to 
some extent, by judges themselves.118 The biggest problem with 
dictionaries is that, because they most often list meanings without 
sufficient context, it is possible to select from among the reported 
meanings without regard to whether that usage of the word is 
appropriate in the context of the legal dispute at hand. Thus, there is 
an incentive for judges to select dictionaries—and particular 
definitions—in a manner that tends to support the position they are 
taking. This incentive negates whatever objectivity there is in using a 
dictionary as opposed to the judge’s own sense of a word’s meaning. 
For example, consider MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. 
AT&T,119 which the Supreme Court decided in 1994. After the 
1970s breakup of AT&T, which had a monopoly on telephone 
service in the United States, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) began to implement regulations that would 
remove barriers for new entrants into the market.120 The Federal 
 
 115.  Id. at 1292. 
 116.  For a good discussion of the confirmation bias, see generally Raymond S. 
Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. 
PSYCHOL. 175 (1998). 
 117.  For an excellent review of this literature, see James Brudney & Lawrence Baum, 
Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 
55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483 (2013). 
 118.  In cases discussed below, Judge Posner criticizes their use in United States v. 
Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012) (summarizing literature critical of judicial 
reliance on dictionaries to ascertain ordinary meaning, focusing on the gap between the 
context-sensitive use of words, and the acontextual nature of dictionary definitions), as does 
Associate Chief Justice Lee of the Supreme Court of Utah in State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, 
¶¶ 42–46, 356 P.3d 1258, 1272–73 (Lee, J., concurring). 
 119.  MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994). 
 120.  Id.  at 220. 
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Communications Act required telephone companies to publish a 
complete listing of their rates121 and not charge more than what they 
published. At the time, telephone rates depended on the locations of 
the caller and the recipient, so this requirement was a burdensome 
one, especially for a company intending to operate nationwide. The 
statute also permitted the FCC to “modify any requirement made by 
or under the authority of this section either in particular instances or 
by general order applicable to special circumstances or conditions.”122 
As part of its efforts to reduce entry barriers to new carriers, the 
FCC “modified” the publication requirement by having it apply only 
to “dominant carriers,” as it defined the term.123 Because AT&T was 
the only dominant carrier at the time, the change in regulation 
would certainly serve the purpose of making it easier for competitors 
to enter the telephone service market. 
AT&T cried foul and sued, naming MCI as one of the non-
dominant carriers that benefitted from the new regulations.124 The 
case made its way to the Supreme Court, which ruled in favor of 
AT&T by a 5–3 vote.125 The decision hinged on whether the FCC 
had exceeded its statutory authority by eliminating the publication 
requirement for a subset of the carriers.126 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia combined etymology and 
lexicography to argue that modify must describe only incremental 
changes, not wholesale elimination: 
The word “modify”—like a number of other English words 
employing the root “mod-” (deriving from the Latin word for 
“measure”), such as “moderate,” “modulate,” “modest,” and 
“modicum”—has a connotation of increment or limitation. 
 
 121.  Federal Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2012). 
 122.  47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2). The Supreme Court describes the history of these new 
regulations in MCI Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 221. 
 123. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 220–21. 
 124. Id. at 221. Of course, AT&T’s dispute was with the FCC, not MCI, which merely 
took advantage of the regulations that had been put in place. Various provisions of the Federal 
Communications Act permitted MCI to be brought into the case as a party. 
 125. Id. at 213. 
 126. Id. at 225. 
2.GALESSOLAN_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2018  3:54 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
1336 
Virtually every dictionary we are aware of says that “to modify” 
means to change moderately or in minor fashion.127 
He went on to cite numerous dictionaries and to berate the 
dissenting justices for relying on Webster’s Third, which includes 
making “a basic or important change” in its definition.128 
We present this extensive detail because the case illustrates what 
is generally problematic when courts rely on dictionaries to 
determine a word’s ordinary meaning. Scalia framed the issue as 
whether modify ordinarily describes an incremental change, rather 
than a major change. Dictionaries do not typically contextualize their 
definitions, so it should come as no surprise that it would have an 
answer that supports the majority’s position. 
The decision to frame the issue as such, however, is not a 
necessary one. Scalia characterized the FCC as having eliminated the 
publication requirement, thus making a major change. It is possible, 
however, to understand the new regulations as leaving the 
publication requirement as it was but adjusting the population to 
which it applied. To illustrate, if a high school requires all students to 
have lunch on campus, the principal might announce that the rule 
has been “modified” by permitting seniors to have their lunch off 
campus.129 We recognize that one may decide that eliminating the 
publication requirement for all but a single actor is more than a 
modification.  Our point here, however, is that dictionary definitions 
are not likely to be of much help in cases like this, in which the 
linguistic dispute is subtler than are the lexicographers’ decisions 
about how to word the definitions, or perhaps the publishing 
company’s policies. 
III. TURNING TO CORPORA 
With the risks of overstating the “ordinariness” of one’s own 
intuitions and keeping the limitations of dictionaries in mind, some 
judges have begun to turn to big data to determine ordinary 
meaning.130 Below we discuss four cases in which courts turned to 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 225–26. 
 129. See generally SOLAN, supra note 14. 
 130. See infra Section III.B. 
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corpora to determine the likely meaning intended by the legislature. 
For each of these cases, we determine the extent to which the four 
conditions set forth in our introduction for optimal corpus analysis 
are present. Where we discover gaps, we point out the uncertainty in 
meaning left unaddressed. First, though, we present a brief 
introduction to corpus linguistics to provide context for readers not 
trained in its methods. 
A. A Brief Introduction to Corpus Linguistics 
Corpus linguistics is an empirical approach to the study of 
language variation and use “resulting in research findings which have 
much greater generalizability and validity than would otherwise be 
feasible.”131 Its two primary goals are “assessing the extent to which a 
[linguistic] pattern is found” and “analyzing the contextual features 
that influence [linguistic] variability.”132 For the past few decades, 
corpus methods have been revolutionizing all branches of linguistics 
and, more recently, providing more scientifically grounded insights 
into the study of language in forensic and legal contexts. 
A corpus is a large collection of naturally occurring texts that are 
sampled to be representative of a particular type of language 
variety.133 There are two basic types of corpora: general and 
specialized. General corpora—sometimes called reference corpora—
are large (frequently millions to billions of words) and usually aim to 
capture a range of registers that are representative of a common 
language variety.134 Specialized corpora are typically smaller 
(frequently thousands to millions of words) and focus on a more 
specific or less accessible variety of language.135 
 
 131. Douglas Biber, Corpus-Based and Corpus-Driven Analyses of Language Variation 
and Use, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 193, 193 (Bernd Heine & 
Heiko Narrog eds., 2012). 
 132. DOUGLAS BIBER, SUSAN CONRAD & RANDI REPPEN, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: 
INVESTIGATING LANGUAGE STRUCTURE AND USE 3 (1998). 
 133.  TONY MCENERY ET AL., CORPUS-BASED LANGUAGE STUDIES: AN ADVANCED 
RESOURCE BOOK 4 (2006). 
 134. For an excellent discussion of representativeness in corpus design in this volume, see 
James C. Phillips & Jesse Egbert, A Concise How-to-Guide for Law and Corpus Linguistics: 
Importing Principles and Practices from Survey and Content-Analysis Methodologies to Improve 
Corpus Design and Analysis, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1589. 
 135. MCENERY ET AL., supra note 133, at 15. 
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Examples of general corpora include Brigham Young University’s 
Corpus of Historical American English (COHA), Corpus of Global 
Web-based English (GloWbE), and Corpus of Contemporary 
American English (COCA), the last of which is probably the best-
known, publicly available reference corpus and comprises 520 
million words from 1990 to 2015, balanced over five registers (one 
spoken and four written).136 Examples of specialized corpora include 
the Blog Authorship Corpus (BAC),137 the Communicated Threat 
Assessment Reference Corpus (CTARC),138 the Enron Email 
Dataset/Corpus,139 and BYU’s Corpus of U.S. Supreme Court 
Opinions (COSCOTUS).140 
The creation and use of corpora are not new phenomena. Early 
field anthropologists and lexicographers used to collect individual 
words on slips of paper, documenting their origin, date of 
acquisition, meaning, and, occasionally, the context in which they 
were used.141 These “shoebox” corpora were the basis for some of 
the first English dictionaries that included contextual information 
about a word: Charles Richardson’s New Dictionary of the English 
Language (1837) and James Murray’s subsequent twelve-volume 
New English Dictionary on Historical Principles (1884–1928)—now 
better-known as the Oxford English Dictionary, or the OED.142 
These early corpora gave lexicographers observable evidence to 
provide more information about a word’s origin, sense 
differentiation, and examples of use in context. 
 
 136. See CORPUS.BYU.EDU, http://corpus.byu.edu/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2018); CORPUS 
CONT. AM. ENG., http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2018). 
 137. BLOG AUTHORSHIP CORPUS, http://u.cs.biu.ac.il/~koppel/BlogCorpus.htm (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2018). 
 138. Tammy Gales, Ideologies of Violence: A Corpus and Discourse Analytic Approach 
to Stance in Threatening Communications (June 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of California, Davis). 
 139. ENRON EMAIL DATASET, http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~enron/ (last visited Jan. 
27,  2018). 
 140. CORPUS U.S. SUP. CT. OPINIONS, http://corpus.byu.edu/scotus/ (last visited Jan. 
27, 2018). 
 141. MCENERY ET AL., supra note 133, at 3; M.A.K. Halliday, Lexicology, in 
LEXICOLOGY AND CORPUS LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 1, 14 (M.A.K. Halliday et al. 
eds., 2004). 
 142. Halliday, supra note 141, at 15.  
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In the 1960s, what is considered the first modern corpus was 
released: the Brown University Standard Corpus of Present-day 
American English, which sampled 500 chunks of 2000 words, each 
from texts from fifteen categories such as press reportage, religion, 
popular lore, mystery fiction, and humor.143 With continuing 
advances in computer technology, in 1987, John Sinclair at the 
University of Birmingham, United Kingdom, published the first fully 
corpus-based dictionary, COBUILD, which was based on the Bank 
of English corpus.144 And, in 1999, the first fully corpus-based 
grammar to highlight register variation was published: the Longman 
Grammar of Spoken and Written English, which was based entirely 
on the forty-million-word Longman Spoken and Written English 
Corpus.145 Since then, the number and size of corpora have 
increased  and represent a range of written and spoken global 
language  varieties. 
There are now many ways in which general and specialized 
corpora are being compiled.146 Corpora can be diachronic or 
synchronic. Diachronic corpora include similar kinds of texts across a 
range of time periods, allowing for investigations of language use 
and change over time. Synchronic corpora, on the other hand, 
include texts from a single time period, allowing for closer 
comparisons of language varieties within that time frame. Two well-
known examples of diachronic, or historical, corpora are A 
Representative Corpus of Historical English Registers (ARCHER)—
a 1.8 million-word corpus of British and American English from a 
range of genres from 1650 to 1990147—and the Diachronic Part of 
the Helsinki Corpus of English Texts (the Helsinki corpus)—a 1.5 
million word collection of Old to Early Modern English from the 
 
 143. MCENERY ET AL., supra note 133, at 4, 61–62. 
 144. Wolfgang Teubert, Language and Corpus Linguistics, in LEXICOLOGY AND CORPUS 
LINGUISTICS, supra note 141, at 73, 111. 
 145. DOUGLAS BIBER ET AL., LONGMAN GRAMMAR OF SPOKEN AND WRITTEN ENGLISH 
4 (1999). 
 146. For an up-to-date compilation of corpus tools, corpora, and corpus research, see 
Martin Weisser’s CORPUS-BASED LINGUISTICS LINKS, http://martinweisser.org/corpora 
_site/CBLLinks.html (last updated Oct. 14, 2016) (formerly David Lee’s Corpus-based 
Resources). The website also contains additional information for corpora in other languages and 
language varieties (e.g., learner, multilingual, and parallel corpora). Id.  
 147. See id. 
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eighth to eighteenth centuries.148 A third example is BYU’s soon-to-
be released Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA), 
which will include at least 100 million words from a range of 
registers from 1760 to 1799.149 A popular collection of synchronic 
corpora is the International Corpus of English (ICE), which 
currently consists of one-million-word corpora sampled from similar 
registers and time periods from twenty-three different English-
speaking countries, such as Canada, Fiji, India, Ireland, Malta, New 
Zealand, Nigeria, and South Africa, making comparative studies 
across language varieties possible.150 
Corpora can also be described as sample (or static) corpora or 
monitor corpora. Sample corpora are compiled once (whether 
diachronic or synchronic) and then no texts are added after the 
completion date, i.e., their size remains the same. The Brown and 
Frown corpora of American English and LOB/FLOB corpora of 
British English are good examples of sample corpora.151 Each of the 
four corpora contains approximately one million words from a 
variety of registers of written English, with texts for Brown and LOB 
having been published in 1961 and texts for Frown and FLOB in 
1991. Monitor corpora, on the other hand, continually grow in size 
at regular intervals, allowing researchers to monitor language change 
across time periods in a dynamic manner. Examples include BYU’s 
News on the Web (NOW) corpus—with five to six million words 
added from web-based newspapers and magazines every day152—and 
the previously mentioned COCA, with twenty million words per 
each of five registers added every year.153 
 
 148. See Helsinki Corpus of English Texts, VARIENG, http://www.helsinki.fi/varieng
/CoRD/corpora/HelsinkiCorpus/ (last updated Oct. 14,  2011). 
 149. See James C. Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics & 
Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J.F. 
21, 31 (2016). 
 150. See The International Corpus of English, UCL SURV. ENG. USAGE, http://www.ucl
.ac.uk/english-usage/projects/ice.htm (last updated Dec. 1, 2016). 
 151. MCENERY ET AL., supra note 133, at 15. 
 152.  See NOW CORPUS (NEWS ON WEB), https://corpus.byu.edu/now/ (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2018). 
 153.  See CORPUS CONTEMP. AM. ENG., http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/ (last visited Jan. 
27, 2018). 
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Corpus research over the past few decades has revealed 1) the 
extensive variation that exists in the use of features across different 
genres and registers;154 2) has highlighted the contextually-
dependent nature of meaning, demonstrating how, instead of being 
located within individual words in a text, it is distributed within and 
across texts through prosodic collocations of features;155 and 3) has 
emphasized the importance of testing intuitions about patterns of 
language structure and use within corpora. This is because: 
each of us has only a partial knowledge of the language, we have 
prejudices and preferences, our memory is weak, our imagination is 
powerful (so we can conceive of possible contexts for the most 
implausible utterances), and we tend to notice unusual words or 
structures but often overlook ordinary ones.156 
This has led to two distinct but complementary approaches to 
the study of language structure and use: corpus-based and corpus-
driven.157 While both approaches are empirical and based on 
observations of large quantities of language data, corpus-based 
studies start with individual hypotheses about specific linguistic 
features and then examine how those features are distributed and 
function within a corpus; corpus-driven studies allow the linguistic 
features of interest to emerge from the corpus itself.158 Thus, posing 
appropriate questions of the corpora, examining empirical evidence 
arising from the results, and integrating both complementary 
approaches results in a more well-rounded examination of language 
data that may otherwise be overlooked.159 These issues are discussed 
in the case descriptions below. 
 
 
 154.  See BIBER, CONRAD & REPPEN, supra note 132. 
 155.  See Teubert, supra note 144, at 73. 
 156.  Ramesh Krishnamurthy, Collocation: From “Silly Ass” to Lexical Sets, in WORDS IN 
CONTEXT: A TRIBUTE TO JOHN SINCLAIR ON HIS RETIREMENT 32–33 (Chris Heffer et al. 
eds., 2000). 
 157.  See generally ELENA TOGNINI-BONELLI, CORPUS LINGUISTICS AT WORK (2001). 
For a critique of the division of these approaches, see MCENERY ET AL, supra note 133. 
 158.  See Biber, supra note 131.  
 159.  See Richard Xiao, Theory-Driven Corpus Research: Using Corpora to Inform Aspect 
Theory, in CORPUS LINGUISTICS: AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK 987 (Anke Lüdeling & 
Merja Kytö eds., 2008). 
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B. Four Conditions that Make Corpus Analysis Efficacious in 
Legal  Analysis 
As we noted in the Introduction to this Article, the use of corpus 
analysis in legal argumentation is most efficacious when certain 
conditions hold.160 In this section, we discuss those conditions in 
greater detail. 
1. The legal issue in the case must concern the distribution of language 
usage over a particular population 
We have already discussed the fact that ordinary meaning is not 
the universal standard in cases of statutory interpretation.161 Rather, 
it is a default rule that can be overridden when the particular 
circumstances of a case suggest the legislature had a broader or 
narrower meaning in mind. Different judges have different 
thresholds when it comes to determining when the ordinary 
meaning of a term should not predominate. As the sharp debates 
among the Justices reveal, the central issue is the extent to which a 
court investigates the circumstances surrounding a law’s enactment, 
draws inferences as to what the law was intended to accomplish, and 
decides whether the “ordinary meaning” of the language in the law 
is either too narrow or too broad to accomplish those goals. The 
cases discussed above in section I.B illustrate the lack of consensus 
on these important methodological issues.  
2. The court must adopt a clear notion of ordinary meaning 
By the same token, when ordinary meaning does prevail, the 
court must decide what ordinary meaning means.162 There are many 
ways to address this question. Preliminarily, we wish to draw a 
distinction between two concepts of what makes 
meaning  “ordinary.” 
Ordinary Meaning 1 (“OM1”): The ordinary meaning of a term 
is a description of the circumstances in which the term is most 
likely to be used. 
 
 160.   See supra Intro. 
 161.  See supra Section I.B. 
 162.  See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 1. 
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Ordinary Meaning 2 (“OM2”): The ordinary meaning of a term 
is a description of the circumstances in which members of a 
relevant speech community would express comfort in using the 
term to describe the circumstances. More than one meaning may 
be ordinary for a term under this theory. 
We believe that each of these meanings of ordinary meaning may 
have its place in legal analysis. When a term has distinct senses, it 
makes sense to ask whether one of them predominates in ordinary 
usage, and an appropriate corpus provides a good tool for 
performing this comparison. OM1 invites this inquiry. 
In contrast, how should courts view ordinary meaning when the 
issue in a case is whether a single sense of a word can be used in its 
ordinary sense in two distinct but related circumstances? When a 
term can be used in distinct but highly related circumstances, OM2 
may tell us that both circumstances may be considered ordinary. 
A disagreement between Justices Breyer and Ginsburg over these 
two notions of ordinary meaning took place in Muscarello v. United 
States.163 The law in dispute called for an enhanced sentence for the 
perpetrator who “uses or carries a firearm” “during and in relation 
to” “a drug trafficking crime.”164 Muscarello had drugs in one part 
of his car and a gun in another, as he drove to a drug deal he was 
planning to make.165 The nine justices agreed that the issue in the 
case was whether he had “carried” a firearm in the ordinary sense,166 
but they disagreed by five to four on which meaning was the 
ordinary one. Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer held that 
Muscarello had done so.167 Much of the decision168 (and Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent169) focused on a battle over which dictionaries 
should be considered authoritative. Additional arguments were 
adduced based on etymology,170 the use of carry one way or the 
other in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century literature171 and in the 
 
 163.  Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998). 
 164.  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2012). 
 165.  Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 127. 
 166.  Id. at 127–28, 139. 
 167.  Id. at 125. 
 168.  Id. at 128. 
 169.  Id. at 142–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 170.  Id. at 128 (majority opinion). 
 171.  Id. at 129. 
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Bible,172 and the order of definitions in dictionaries, even the Oxford 
English Dictionary173 in which the order of definitions is historical 
and not a matter of most common usage.174 Based on this process, 
Breyer determined that the ordinary meaning of carry a firearm 
includes carrying the firearm in a vehicle and that carrying a gun on 
one’s person is a “special” use of the term.175 
In addition, Breyer conducted a search of items found in Lexis 
and Westlaw news libraries, using the words carry and weapon in 
close proximity: 
We looked for sentences in which the words “carry,” “vehicle,” and 
“weapon” (or variations thereof) all appear. We found thousands of 
such sentences, and random sampling suggests that many, perhaps 
more than one-third, are sentences used to convey the meaning at 
issue here, i.e., the carrying of guns in a car.176 
Not surprisingly, Justice Ginsburg retorted in dissent: “One is 
left to wonder what meaning showed up some two-thirds of 
the  time.”177 
This exchange, short as it is, illustrates the lack of consensus 
about what makes ordinary meaning ordinary. Although Breyer’s 
analysis may suggest that both meanings are acceptable, he remained 
committed to an OM1 analysis, not acknowledging that the one-
third rate of occurrence may suggest to others that more than one 
meaning is available. Ginsburg’s response, without actually taking 
the position that the meaning most commonly instantiated should 
prevail, at least suggests that looking at the data more closely is a 
reasonable approach.178 
 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. at 128; see Mouritsen, Dictionary, supra note 1, at 1934. 
 174.  See John Simpson, Preface to the Third Edition of the OED, OXFORD ENG. 
DICTIONARY (March 2000), http://public.oed.com/the-oed-today/preface-to-the-third-
edition-of-the-oed/. 
 175.  Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128. 
 176.  Id. at 129. 
 177.  Id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 178.  Id. 
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3. Conducting the right search on the right corpus 
There is a second problem with the use of the corpus to 
determine ordinary meaning in Muscarello. As Stephen Mouritsen 
points out, Breyer conducted the wrong search.179 Ginsburg’s quip in 
dissent misses this point as well. What matters is not the relative 
frequency with which carry a weapon suggests carrying it in a vehicle 
when the word vehicle is mentioned but rather the relative frequency 
with which carry a weapon suggests carrying it in a vehicle whether 
or not the word vehicle is mentioned. After all, the statute itself says 
nothing about vehicles. 
Mouritsen conducted two sets of searches in COCA.180 The first 
set of searches picked out only uses of the verb to carry.181 Mouritsen 
analyzed a sample of 500 of them.182 Many had nothing to do with 
the issues in Muscarello, with uses such as “my cable service doesn’t 
carry CNBC.”183 Of those that involved a person carrying an object, 
85% involved carrying something on one’s person; the remaining 
15% involved carrying something in some kind of vehicle or on 
an  animal.184 
More pointedly, Mouritsen also looked at instances in which 
carry is used in proximity to words denoting various weapons: 
firearm, gun, handgun, rifle, and pistol.185 He found that carry was 
clearly meant to describe carrying a weapon on one’s person 64% of 
the time, clearly used to describe carrying the weapon in a vehicle 3% 
of the time, and either ambiguous between the two or referring to 
neither the rest of the time.186 From these results, Mouritsen infers 
that Breyer was incorrect in asserting that carrying a gun on one’s 
person embraces an unusual or “special” meaning of the term and 
that a broader meaning, at the very least, is included in the norm.187 
 
 179.  See Mouritsen, Dictionary, supra note 1, at 1948. 
 180.  Id. at 1958. 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  See id. 
 184.  Id. at 1961. 
 185.  Id. at 1963. 
 186.  Id. at 1965. 
 187.  Id. at 1927–28. 
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We do not believe that this ends the matter, however. For just as 
law contains defeasible default rules, so does language. Linguists 
speak of “the unmarked case” as the default case.188 This may reflect 
syntactic choices, as illustrated below. 
“Bill likes to sip iced tea after a long day of construction work.” 
“After a long day of construction work, Bill likes to sip iced tea.” 
Although we are comfortable with both sentences, it makes sense 
to conclude that the default phrasal order in English has the 
temporal phrase coming after the main clause because the temporal 
phrase modifies the verb phrase semantically. 
When it comes to meaning, we can say that the unmarked 
meaning of an expression is the way it would ordinarily be 
understood without further modification. Consider: 
“In my state, it is legal to carry a weapon openly on campus.” 
We believe that most people would understand this sentence as 
referring to carrying a weapon on one’s person in plain sight. Of 
course, one can modify the sentence: 
“In my state, it is legal to carry a weapon in one’s automobile while 
driving on campus.” 
Without this modification, we assume the default interpretation. 
For this reason, we share Mouritsen’s surprise that Justice Breyer’s 
search yielded only about one-third instances in which a weapon was 
being carried in a vehicle. We would have expected the modification 
of carry by vehicle to have yielded higher numbers. 
This leads us to a final point: The ordinary way to carry a pistol 
may well be on one’s person, but the ordinary way to carry an army 
tank is, perhaps, in a cargo plane. And the ordinary way to carry a 
canon is in some other vehicle, the nature of which has changed over 
the centuries. All of this suggests a different analysis. Perhaps there 
are not two separate senses of to carry when used to describe people 
moving something from one place to another. Perhaps there is only a 
single sense, but as a default we assume that a sentence using the 
 
 188.  See EDWARD FINEGAN, LANGUAGE: ITS STRUCTURE AND USE 196–97 (6th 
ed.  2012). 
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verb describes the most natural way of carrying whatever the direct 
object is unless a different mode is specified. 
If this indeed is how we use the word carry in everyday speech, 
what does it say about corpus analysis as a means for resolving a legal 
dispute? If six members of a gang drive to a drug deal in a van 
loaded with large firearms and come out shooting, we would 
probably say that this statute applies to them. Muscarello’s activities, 
in contrast, are less clear. We can certainly say that he carried the gun 
in his car. But if we simply say that he “carried a gun to a drug deal,” 
we are most likely to assume that he had the gun on his person. The 
legislature could have clarified the statute by adding “on his person, 
in a vehicle, or otherwise,” to carry, but it did not do so. 
When it comes to weapons whose sizes permit carrying them 
either in a vehicle or on one’s person, in most instances, the word 
carry is used to describe carrying the weapon on one’s person. This 
is the result of an OM1 analysis,189 although it comes out exactly the 
opposite of Justice Breyer’s OM1 analysis. An OM2 analysis, in 
contrast, asks only if there are enough instances of both meanings to 
demonstrate that speakers are relatively comfortable using the term 
both ways, regardless of distributional facts between them. In about 
one-third of the occurrences in Mouritsen’s analysis it is not possible 
to tell how the weapon was being carried.190 Thus, it appears to us 
that people are generally comfortable using the verb to carry to 
denote carrying an object in a vehicle. As noted, however, for small 
objects, the default interpretation is that it is being carried on 
one’s  person. 
This leaves a sufficient measure of uncertainty about meaning to 
trigger the rule of lenity, in our opinions. That rule resolves 
uncertainty in the interpretation of criminal statutes in favor of the 
defendant. From the language of the statute alone, it is not possible 
to determine whether Congress had in mind enhancing the sentence 
of those who carried a firearm with them into the actual drug 
transaction, or whether the law was intended to apply more broadly 
to those who brought firearms with them in their vehicles but left 
 
 189. See supra text accompanying note 152. 
 190.  Mouritsen, Dictionary, supra note 1. 
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the weapons there during the transaction itself. Ginsburg relies on 
this principle, in part, in her dissent.191 
In 2016, the Supreme Court of Michigan decided People v. 
Harris.192 The question in Harris was whether police officers who 
had testified falsely in a disciplinary hearing had provided 
“information” in that hearing. A Michigan law, the Disclosures by 
Law Enforcement Officers Act (DLEOA), immunizes information 
testified to in such contexts from use in a subsequent criminal 
prosecution.193 The purpose of the law is to enable the state to 
compel the testimony of law enforcement officers in disciplinary 
proceedings without violating their constitutional right to refrain 
from providing self-incriminating testimony that can be used against 
them in a criminal case.194 
Three officers were present at a traffic stop; one of them 
assaulted the driver without adequate cause while the others 
watched.195 The officers testified falsely in their disciplinary hearings, 
not knowing that someone had made a video recording of the entire 
incident.196 The officers were subsequently prosecuted for 
obstruction of justice.197 All seven justices on the court were 
comfortable using COCA to ascertain the ordinary meaning of 
information.198 However, they divided four to three on the outcome 
of the case.199 The disagreement among the justices arose from 
deciding which corpus analysis should be conducted. The majority 
correctly pointed out that information can be used with modifiers 
such as false and inaccurate to denote false statements.200 It held that 
the word information can be used to describe both truthful and false 
statements, making the officers’ false testimony inadmissible.201 
Objecting to the dissenters’ position that information when not 
 
 191.  Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 150 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 192.  People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832 (Mich. 2016). 
 193.  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.393 (2006). 
 194.  Harris, 885 N.W.2d at 843. 
 195.  Id. at 834. 
 196.  Id. at 835. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. at 838–39. 
 199.  Id. at 861 (Markman, J., concurring & dissenting). 
 200.  Id. at 839 (majority opinion). 
 201.  Id. at 843–44. 
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modified is almost always used to describe truthful statements, the 
majority remarked: 
Empirical data from the COCA, however, demonstrates the 
opposite. In common usage, “information” is regularly used in 
conjunction with adjectives suggesting it may be both true and 
false. This strongly suggests that the unmodified word 
“information,” can describe either true or false statements. 
Moreover, by reading each identified use of the word 
“information” in its surrounding context, it is clear that 
“information” is often used to describe false statements. Quite 
simply, “information” in common parlance describes perceptions 
conveyed about the world around us, which may be true or false.202 
But as the dissenting justices pointed out, a COCA search 
revealed that without modification, information is generally used to 
denote accurate information, rejecting the majority’s conclusion that 
the presence of veracity adjectives in both directions indicates that 
the unmodified form of the noun can be understood equally 
both  ways.203 
Making matters more uncertain, we do not know whether the 
legislature intended to use the term to cover the word regardless of 
modification, or whether the bare word, as it appears, was meant to 
be understood that way. In this sense, Harris resembles Muscarello in 
the statute’s lack of clarity. 
In United States v. Costello,204 following his criticism of excessive 
reliance on dictionaries, Judge Posner used a Google News search to 
determine that a woman did not “harbor” her boyfriend, an 
undocumented immigrant, in violation of a federal statute, by 
allowing him to live with her, at least not if the court relied upon the 
ordinary meaning of the verb to harbor.205 
Posner reported the results of a search he conducted, showing 
what words most frequently co-occur with harbor (called 
“collocates” in the language of corpus linguistics and 
 
 202.  Id. at 839. 
 203.  Id. at 850 n.14 (Markman, J., concurring & dissenting). 
 204.  United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 205.  Id. at 1044, 1050. 
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lexicography).206 There were thousands of hits for harboring Jews, 
enemies, Quakers, refugees and fugitives, but few or none for 
harboring victims or guests.207 Posner concluded: 
It is apparent from these results that “harboring,” as the word is 
actually used, has a connotation—which “sheltering,” and a fortiori 
“giving a person a place to stay”—does not, of deliberately 
safeguarding members of a specified group from the authorities, 
whether through concealment, movement to a safe location, or 
physical protection. This connotation enables one to see that the 
emergency staff at the hospital may not be “harboring” an alien 
when it renders emergency treatment even if he stays in the 
emergency room overnight, that giving a lift to a gas station to an 
alien with a flat tire may not be harboring, that driving an alien to 
the local office of the Department of Homeland Security to apply 
for an adjustment of status to that of lawful resident may not be 
harboring, that inviting an alien for a “one night stand” may not be 
attempted harboring, that placing an illegal alien in a school may 
not be harboring, and finally that allowing your boyfriend to live 
with you may not be harboring, even if you know he shouldn’t be 
in the United States.208 
Lee and Mouritsen criticize Posner’s use of Google in part 
because Google does not publish its algorithm for obtaining hits and 
is therefore not transparent.209 Moreover, Google searches only 
contemporaneous web pages and there is no basis for concluding 
that counting appearances on the web accurately reflects ordinary 
meaning in broader contexts.210 On the plus side, Posner’s search 
comports with linguistic literature showing that some expressions 
have semantic prosody, that is positive or negative connotations that 
do not typically make their way into dictionary definitions.211 In our 
opinions, while the criticism of Posner’s choice of corpus is valid, his 
 
 206.  Id. at 1044. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  Id. at 1044–45 (citations omitted). 
 209.  See Lee and Mouritsen, supra note 1. 
 210.  See id. 
 211.  Michael Stubbs, Quantitative Data on Multi-Word Sequences in English: The Case of 
the Word World, in TEXT, DISCOURSE AND CORPORA: THEORY AND ANALYSIS 163 (Michael 
Hoey et al. eds., 2007). 
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analysis is sufficiently robust as to put the burden on critics to argue 
that a better corpus analysis would yield different results.  
4. Caution in drawing inferences from the absence of particular usages 
in a corpus: the merits of double dissociation 
When a particular usage appears frequently in a corpus, it is 
reasonable to infer that the speakers or writers whose language has 
been recorded are comfortable using the term in the way the corpus 
instantiates. In contrast, as noted in the introduction to this Article, 
the absence of data in the corpus may reflect a linguistic fact—a 
usage is absent because people do not use the term that way—or a 
fact about the world—people may express a concept in a way not 
present in the corpus but just do not talk about such a thing much, 
and for that reason, it does not show up in the corpus. 
Consider first the classic 1892 case, Church of the Holy Trinity v. 
United States.212 A law made it illegal to: 
[I]n any manner whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in 
any way assist or encourage the importation or migration, of any 
alien or aliens, any foreigner or foreigners, into the United 
States, . . . under contract or agreement, . . . made previous to the 
importation or migration of such alien or aliens, foreigner or 
foreigners, to perform labor or service of any kind in the 
United  States . . . .213  
A wealthy church in Manhattan had paid for the transportation 
of its new rector from England to New York and was prosecuted for 
having violated the law.214 The Supreme Court ruled unanimously 
that the statute did not apply to these facts.215 This case has remained 
controversial for 125 years since its publication in part because of its 
reliance on legislative history to determine the intent of the 
legislature216 and in part because of its reliance on “the spirit” of the 
 
 212.  Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
      213.     Id. at 458. 
 214.  Id. at 457–58. 
 215.  Id. at 472. 
 216.  Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History 
in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 905 (2000). 
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statute.217 What often goes unnoticed in discussions of this case is 
that, in many respects, it is a paradigmatic case about ordinary 
meaning. The title of the act was: “An act to prohibit the 
importation and migration of foreigners and aliens under contract or 
agreement to perform labor in the United States, its Territories and 
the District of Columbia.”218 Taking advantage of the fact that the 
title does not mention performing service, whereas the body of the 
statute does, Justice Brewer remarked in his opinion: 
Obviously the thought expressed in this reaches only to the work of 
the manual laborer, as distinguished from that of the professional 
man. No one reading such a title would suppose that Congress had 
in its mind any purpose of staying the coming into this country of 
ministers of the gospel, or, indeed, of any class whose toil is that of 
the brain. The common understanding of the terms labor and 
laborers does not include preaching and preachers; and it is to be 
assumed that words and phrases are used in their ordinary 
meaning. So whatever of light is thrown upon the statute by the 
language of the title indicates an exclusion from its penal provisions 
of all contracts for the employment of ministers, rectors, 
and  pastors.219 
Thus, putting the spirit of the law aside, Brewer argued that it is 
unnatural to consider members of the clergy as performing “labor,” 
even though it is possible to acknowledge that they do so by using 
an expansive concept of what constitutes “labor.” In many ways, 
Brewer’s argument in Holy Trinity Church presages Scalia’s ordinary 
meaning argument in his dissenting opinion in Chisom v. Roemer,220 
the Voting Rights Act case discussed above. 
Now let us return to Smith v. United States,221 the case in which a 
majority of six Supreme Court justices ruled that a person who 
traded an unloaded machine gun for cocaine was subject to a harsher 
 
 217.  See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 19–20 (1998). The 
offending sentence in the opinion is “It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter 
of the statute and yet not within the statute because not within its spirit nor within the 
intention of its makers.” Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459. 
 218.  Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 463. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991). 
 221.  Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). 
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sentence by virtue of having “used a firearm during and in relation 
to a drug trafficking crime.”222 Scalia’s colorful dissent ridiculed the 
majority for confusing ordinary meaning with some possible meaning. 
Scalia was right that when we think of using a gun we think of using 
it as a weapon.223 No doubt a COCA search would show many more 
instances of use and gun collocating when the gun was being used as 
a weapon than as an object of value to be bartered. 
But the majority was also right to say that, given what Smith did, 
it does not sound strange to describe his activity as using a gun even 
if it is an unusual way to use a gun. That is, Scalia engaged in an 
OM1 analysis while the majority engaged in an OM2 analysis. In 
cases like Chisolm and Church of the Holy Trinity, they will produce 
the same result. In both of those cases, the reason that representative 
and labor are used principally, as the Court describes, is because the 
relevant terms are not generally used to convey the alternative 
meaning (judge as representative or clergyman as laborer). 
We believe that the most efficient way to demonstrate that a 
corpus analysis is uncovering a linguistic regularity, rather than the 
mere fact that some things are spoken about less frequently than are 
others, is to demonstrate that the circumstances described by the 
infrequently used term are present in the corpus but spoken about 
differently. For example, if there had been a dispute about whether 
judicial elections are within the ordinary meaning of elections of 
“representatives” in Chisolm, it would be possible to show not only 
that election, judge, and representative do not show up together in 
the corpus with any regularity but also that judicial elections are 
described using different language when discussed. 
The argument is akin to the double dissociation sometimes used 
in brain studies involving language deficits.224 For example, we know 
that damage to the Broca’s area of the brain affects the ability to 
 
 222.  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2012). The same statute was at issue in Muscarello. The law 
makes it a crime to “use or carry” a firearm in the context of a drug trafficking crime. 
 223. See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 404 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia’s dissent was also more 
like the unanimous decision in Church of the Holy Trinity than he would have wished. Both 
employed strong arguments based on ordinary usage. For further discussion, see SOLAN, supra 
note 14. 
 224.  For seminal work on double dissociation, see A.R. LURIA, RESTORATION OF 
FUNCTION AFTER BRAIN INJURY (O.L. Zangwill ed., Basil Haigh trans., 1963). 
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speak fluidly but does not affect comprehension. Damage to the 
Wernicke’s area of the brain does just the opposite.225 
Correspondingly, the strongest corpus arguments occur when not 
only one usage predominates over another in the corpus but when, 
in addition, the circumstances describable in the infrequently 
instantiated case are present in the corpus but described using other 
language. Using a combination of corpus-based and corpus-driven 
approaches will help reveal such variation in use. 
We similarly caution against inferring that a prototypical use of 
an expression is necessarily the most frequently occurring usage.226  
The giraffe is the prototypical tall animal, not because we speak more 
of giraffes in that regard than we do, say, of camels, but because 
giraffes have the essential feature of tallness to an unusual extent 
among animals. Double dissociation can serve to reduce the 
likelihood of this false inference as well. 
C. Getting it Right 
Let us now turn to a case in which the four conditions are met. 
Here, we focus on Associate Chief Justice Lee’s concurring opinion 
in the Utah Supreme Court case, State v. Rasabout,227 which, like 
Harris, relied on a corpus analysis using COCA. Justice Lee had 
been a full-time law professor at BYU before his appointment to the 
bench and is familiar with how to conduct a corpus analysis. The 
legal issue, as the justices taking different positions agreed, was the 
ordinary meaning of the word discharge.228 
Andy Rasabout was a gang member. He fired twelve rounds 
from a semiautomatic weapon at a house and car as he drove by.229 A 
jury convicted him of twelve separate offenses; however, the trial 
court merged them into one count of “discharg[ing] a dangerous 
 
 225.  LANGUAGE FILES: MATERIALS FOR AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE AND 
LINGUISTICS 360 (Anouschka Bergmann et al. eds., 10th ed. 2007). 
 226.  Carissa Hessick also makes this point in her contribution to this volume.  Carissa 
Byrne Hessick, Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law, 2017 BYU L. REV. ___; see Elizabeth 
B. Lynch, John D. Coley & Douglas L. Medin, Tall is Typical: Central Tendency, Ideal 
Dimensions, and Graded Category Structure Among Tree Experts, 28 MEMORY & COGNITION 
41 (2000). 
 227. State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, 356 P.3d 1258. 
 228. Id. ¶¶ 5–6, 356 P.3d at 1261. 
 229. Id. 
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weapon or firearm from an automobile . . . without written 
permission, within 600 feet of a house, dwelling or other 
building.”230 The appellate court reversed, reinstating the jury 
verdict,231 and the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the appellate 
court’s decision. 
The majority opinion, written by Justice Parrish, held that “the 
allowable unit of prosecution for the unlawful-discharge-of-a-firearm 
statute . . . is each discrete shot.”232 In so holding, the court relied 
on the morphology of the word discharge (dis + charge), various 
dictionaries, the statutory definition of firearm (“any device . . . 
from which is expelled a projectile by action of an explosive”),233 the 
purpose of the statute, and the whole act rule.234 
Associate Chief Justice Thomas Lee concurred, applying corpus 
linguistic methodology to the analysis.235 He remarked: 
I would interpret the terms of the statute by looking for real-world 
examples of its key words in actual written language in its native 
context. This sort of analysis has a fancy name—corpus linguistics. 
But it is hardly unusual. We often resolve problems of ambiguity by 
thinking of examples of the use of a given word or phrase in a 
particular linguistic context. I propose to do that (as I have in a 
couple of prior opinions) on a systematic scale—by computer-aided 
searches of online databases in an effort to assemble a greater 
number of examples than I can summon by memory on my own.236 
Justice Lee’s COCA search found a substantial predominance of 
examples in which discharge was used to mean “to shoot” in the 
sense of the majority opinion.237 Justice Lee therefore concluded that 
the ordinary meaning of the verb is “to shoot,” even though it has 
other meanings, and concurred in the judgment based largely on his 
corpus analysis. In doing so, he noted that the majority had ignored 
 
 230. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-508 (West 2016). 
 231. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 1, 356 P.3d at 1261. 
 232. Id. ¶ 15, 356 P.3d. at 1263. 
 233. Id. ¶¶ 12–13, 356 P.3d at 1263–64. 
 234. Id. 
 235. See id. ¶ 40, 356 P.3d at 1271 (Lee, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in  judgment). 
 236. Id. ¶ 41, 356 P.3d at 1271. 
 237.  Id. ¶¶ 81–93, 356 P.3d at 1281–82. 
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the second definition (which would have assisted the defendant’s 
case).238 Rather, the majority had relied on its own intuitions about 
which meaning is ordinary, without adequate inquiry. Instead, he 
argued, the court should take on the burden of acknowledging 
both  definitions and coming to a reasoned decision based on 
empirical  investigation as to which one reflects the verb’s most 
ordinary  sense.239 
Our only quibble with Justice Lee’s analysis is that his argument 
would have been even stronger if he had double dissociated by 
showing that COCA contains examples of the verb to empty to 
express the meaning of discharge proposed by the defendant. Our 
own search shows this to be the case. COCA contains five instances 
of emptying a weapon and thirty-three of emptying a gun. Almost all 
of these were used to express the meaning of discharge that means 
emptying a gun completely.240 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We have attempted in this Article to demonstrate the utility of 
corpus linguistics in the interpretation of laws and to establish 
criteria for the efficacy of this practice. We recognize that this Article 
shifts between having a supportive tone and having a cautionary tone 
to this endeavor. At all times, it should be kept in mind that 
linguistic corpora provide a tool for those engaged in statutory 
interpretation, but they say nothing about when this tool is most 
useful. That judgment must come from a combination of legal 
decisions about whether the distribution of word usage should 
determine the outcome of a case, a further legal decision about what 
“ordinary meaning” should mean in a legal context, and appropriate 
 
 238.  Id. ¶ 88, 356 P.3d at 1282. 
 239.  Justice Lee’s analysis provoked a response from the majority, criticizing him for 
engaging in expert analysis outside the bounds of the adversarial system. The issue was not the 
legitimacy of his argument, but the legitimacy of judges taking the initiative to engage in 
scientific investigation without the parties being afforded the opportunity to cross-examine or 
otherwise challenge the analysis. Id. ¶¶ 16–21, 356 P.3d at 1264–66 (majority opinion). 
Because COCA is publicly available and the results of searches transparent, we are not as 
bothered by Justice Lee’s foray as was the majority. 
 240.  Search conducted on August 4, 2017. For example: “The teenager collapses. Van 
Dyke continues shooting, emptying his weapon. In all, McDonald was shot 16 times.” “And 
then while she was lying dead on the floor, he emptied the gun into her.” 
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use of a corpus when one is used. This last point includes asking the 
right questions, conducting the right searches, and drawing valid 
inferences from both the presence and absence of data reflecting one 
or another specific usage. 
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